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© 2012 Sanjeev Sabhlok's revolutionary blog
Bureaucrats Can Join Political Parties and Contest Elections
One more key feature that I strongly advocate for India is the mobility in Australia not only between the public and private sectors but between the public sector and politics. The Victorian Public Administration Act 2004[i] allows public servants to‘belong to, and hold office in, a political party’. They can also contest elections; but they must resign from the public service before doing that. However they retain ‘the right of re-appointment or re-employment if unsuccessful’,[ii]’“within two months after the declaration of the poll at that election’. Sitting MPs who lose their seats are also permitted to return to their original public service employment.
Relatively few public servants take this route to politics. The more common route is for public servants to resign and become ministerial advisers first, before advancing to senior political roles. As an illustration, the current Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, worked in the Department of Foreign Affairs as a bureaucrat from 1981–8 before becoming a political adviser as Chief of Staff to the Labour Opposition Leader in Queensland. From 1992–5, he reverted to public service, this time as the senior most secretary to the Government of Queensland(he was only 35 then!). Either way, whether people go straight into politics or through the ministerial adviser route, Australian public life is enriched with a continuous supply of very high quality and experienced talent at the political level.
* * *
In addition to these dramatically powerful reforms found in the Australian public services, enormous efforts are constantly underway to further improve governance and the public services. The aim in the West is to make public services an even more useful instrument to protect the freedoms of citizens. For those interested, I have outlined some key areas of reform underway in the West in the Online Notes.[iii]
With this bird’s eye view of modern reforms, it is time to understand the Indian situation in some detail.
[Note: This is an extract from my book, Breaking Free of Nehru]
[i] Available for download from [http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/].
[ii] Halligan, 1997, op. cit.
Access to the Latest Technology, Information and Training
The strategies in place to build capability in the public services in Australia leave the Indian public service system in the dust and adds to the vast gap between the performance of the two services. Australian bureaucrats are provided with the latest information and high quality training, even coaching. No matter how good individual players in a cricket team might be, and no matter how good their captain, we can’t expect them to go very far – unless we choose to live in the Bollywood fictional world of Lagaan – without the best quality cricketing equipment and coaching. When a matter as important as delivering outstanding governance is at stake, there should be no compromise. The following points need to be noted:
- Access to up-to-date electronic databases is crucial for the development of competent policy advice. I have listed some of the databases available to Australian public servants in Appendix 5 of the Online Notes.
- Constant efforts are made to upgrade the skills and capability of public servants. Literally hundreds of specialized training courses are on offer to choose from. I am particularly impressed by the continuous improvement network[i] that brings in people like Edward de Bono, the well-known teacher of creative thinking, to talk to groups of public servants. Participation in the network is voluntary.
- Partial funding as well as leave from work for pursing higher degrees from outstanding Australian universities is also available, depending on the organization’s needs, to public servants who display ambition, competence and commitment. Each public servant is enabled to go as far as he or she wishes to go, or can.
- Not only are the departmental libraries well stocked, but are managed by expert Reference Librarians, who are able to obtain a copy of practically any book published anywhere in the world within a week or two.
This phenomenal access to knowledge contrasts sadly with the information vacuum experienced by public servants in India. Exceptions notwithstanding, access to knowledge is neither sought, nor expected, nor therefore made available to Indian bureaucrats. The following are two illustrative examples:
a) In 1999 and 2000 I was responsible for the oversight of the government’s library services for the state of Meghalaya. Not to talk of district or departmental libraries, even the State Library was in shambles, despite its grandiose building. Similarly, even though I headed the newly created Information Technology department in Meghalaya in 2000, I could not get e-mail on my office computer, not to speak of the internet. Did I do anything to rectify these problems? Yes, I did,[ii] but that is not the point here.
b) India does have a relatively well-equipped national academy of administration in Mussoorie, where I taught in 1994. But what it provides can at best be called induction training. Professional training is quite a different kettle of fish, well beyond its capacity. The Academy doesn’t even teach the basics of economics and public administration properly, leaving a great muddle in the minds of its young officers.
If India wishes to become a greatcountry (recall the ‘mahaan’ in ‘Mera Bharat Mahaan’?), then access to such information, knowledge and training is absolutely critical; not in a remote academy, but at each desk, in each office.
[Note: This is an extract from my book, Breaking Free of Nehru]
[i] See [http://www.vpscin.org/].
[ii] Very briefly, I did get the State Library’s books repaired (most were falling apart) and tried to introduce a bar-coding system for books and membership cards. This system could also be used to prevent mis-filing of books on shelves and prevent the ongoing disappearance of books from the library. On the IT front, I managed to persuade the Government of India to spend Rs 50 lakhs on the Meghalaya Secretariat but before any of this could come to fruition, a senior bureaucrat was irked by my questioning an existing, unproductive effort and I was relieved of my role. You can’t ask questions of politically well-connected and potentially corrupt seniors in India.
Contestability of Policy Advice to Political Leaders
By the 1970s, the bureaucracy in Australia was being seen as being ‘too elitist, too independent, too unrepresentative and insufficiently responsive’.[i] It was the sole provider of ‘small p’ policy advice to Ministers and much of that advice was precedent-based which merely helped to reinforce entrenched bureaucratic practice. The world-leading reforms of the 1970s and 1980s in Australia marked a move away from bureaucratic monopoly over policy advice. As John Halligan notes:
The reaction of Labour governments, in particular, Whitlam’s (1972–75), and Hawke’s (1983–92), was to challenge the public servants’ monopoly over advice to ministers and to question their indispensability to the processes of government. The direction was made explicit in the White Paper Reforming the Australian Public Service (1983): ‘the balance of power and influence has tipped too far in favour of permanent rather than elected office holders’.[ii]
A moment’s reflection will show us that the delivery ofa government’s policy or election commitments does not require a permanent civil service, or even a civil service at all. Anyone, and any organizational form that can best deliver results, will do. After all, as Alexander Pope said:
For forms of government let fools contest;Whate’er is best administer’d is best:
The diagram in the beginning of this chapter shows that public services are, in the theoretical sense, merely one of the many alternative vehicles for the delivery of policy. Reverting to the metaphor of a ship and ship’s captain, we – the country’s (ship’s) owners – first hire a government (i.e. the ship’s captain). The captain should then be completely free to hire whomsoever he wishes to advise him and manage the ship’s day-to-day logistics. After all, the agreement is with the captain. We don’t care whom a captain hires so long as he gets us to the destination.
And so, there is no inherent virtue in policy neutrality at the senior levels in a civil service. A political party elected to government needs specialist leadership best suited to delivering its election commitments. If that means finding people with a strong understanding of the theory and practice of freedom, as would be the case if a liberal political party were to get elected in India, so be it.
Bureaucrats or advisers who can best operationalize the delivery of freedom to us must then be found. In any event, no political leadership, even socialist, should be constrained in selecting its managers only from among a tenured service like the IAS comprising largely fumbling socialist die-hards who have never opened a book on policy after their initial training at the Academy.
Further, the proponents of an ‘impartial’ public service presume, rather disingenuously – even dangerously – an independent role for the unelected bureaucracy in determining the public interest. Bureaucrats are at best our sub-agents, only indirectly accountable to us through our political representatives.
We must therefore leave it to our agents to decide whether they want to use them or hire alternative sub-agents. In any event, they can’t be given any independence. We need to monitor bureaucrats closely, not flatter them by saying they should be independent. We must ensure a clear line of sight for accountability in a democratic political system. It is only by handing over the full control over bureaucrats to our chosen political representatives that we can precisely attribute the success or failure of policy outcomes to our representatives. If a ship hits an iceberg and sinks, we clearly know whom to blame – the captain of the ship. Sailors are mere tools of the captain. Politicians should not be in a position to excuse themselves from responsibility by taking the plea that they were ‘saddled with’ an unresponsive bureaucracy. Hey! Change it anyway you like and make it work! We only care for results and nothing else!
The modern governance system therefore empowers politicians to undertake radical surgery, if necessary, to fix bureaucratic incompetence, sluggishness or policy incompatibility. (If you are interested, I have provided a further discussion of this issue in the Online Notes.[iii])
[Note: This is an extract from my book, Breaking Free of Nehru]
Extensive Delegation of Responsibility
Australian governments have very few departments. Each of them is extremely large and managed by a single secretary. The Australian Government has 18 departments. The Victorian Government has only 10. These extremely few departments are based on the concept of span of control, which makes for a more coherent and functional government. The Australian cabinet also comprises 18–20 ministers only.
In comparison, the Indian Government has over 50 ministries/ departments, and even the tiny state of Meghalaya maintains about 50 departments! More problematically, there is more than one secretary in many ministries or departments in various governments in India, thus creating more than 100 secretaries per government. If, to this large number we add the rigmarole of principal secretaries, commissioners and secretaries, additional secretaries, joint secretaries, directors, deputy secretaries and under secretaries, then the number of senior executives in India quickly multiplies into the tens of thousands across the country. (Fortunately, the number of secretaries in small states like Meghalaya is fewer, since many hold charge of more than one department.)
The reason why Australia is able to manage with so few departments and senior executives is that, first, these senior executives are far more competent and productive than their Indian counterparts and, second, because they are able to delegate extensively within their departments. This delegation is made possible because secretaries directly recruit individuals who report to them. This first-hand knowledge of the calibre of their direct reports gives them the confidence to leave them alone to perform their jobs; micro-management is not needed. The secretary is able to devote time to strategic thinking and people development since everyone is competent for his or her level.
At professional levels below the executive, there is a solid base of analytical and writing skills in each Australian department. Policy specialists are hired in far greater proportions in Australia than in India. For example, there are over 100 high quality economists in the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance, apart from nearly 100 finance professionals like chartered accountants. Other departments also hire high calibre economists and policy specialists. Each Victorian policy is thus carefully reviewed for compatibility with the principles of the relevant specialization as well as economic principles to ensure the best outcome for the state. In comparison, the state of Assam, where I have also worked, has probably ten modestly skilled economists between its two main Departments of Finance and Planning & Development. A strong base of highly skilled policy specialists gives senior executives in Australia the confidence to delegate far down the chain.
As a result, Australian departments are middle-heavy, unlike in India where they are top-heavy. Most senior executive positions in Australia are clustered at the Director level or lower, i.e. at the operational end. (By no means is a Director a junior position; their responsibility and pay is comparable to that of general managers in large private sector firms). This extensive delegation of responsibility also leads to great agility. Directors, or even Assistant Directors, advised by knowledgeable professionals, are empowered to directly brief Ministers on matters of relatively small policy impact without having to ‘go through’ the secretary. It can therefore take only five to ten minutes for a completed policy briefing that may have taken ten days to prepare, to be delivered to the Minister’s office electronically, followed by the hand delivery of the hard copy with signatures from a couple of relevant officials. And of course there is no peon here! Officers take the signed policy briefings directly to Ministers’ offices. As a result, no paperwork sits for weeks or even months on any officer’s desk as it does in India.
[Note: This is an extract from my book, Breaking Free of Nehru]
Graduate Intake into Specific Positions, Not into a ‘Service’
Similar on the surfaceto recruitment into the IAS, graduate recruitment programmes in the Australian public services take in some of the best graduates available in the country or state after a gruelling system of tests and interviews (noting that there is no minimum or maximum age requirement, and final selection decision rests with the relevant departmental manager). Recruits are provided an on-the-job training for one year through job rotation in different roles in different departments, as well as induction which is provided by professional trainers hired by the public service authorities.[i] But the system diverges radically after that from the Indian one.
After the twelve months, those who meet requirements are confirmed into a junior professional (tenured) position in their recruiting department. Alternatively, the better ones are ‘bid’ up, i.e. paid more, and picked up by competing departments. At that stage they earn approximately what a new school teacher gets. Many of these recruits choose not to continue with the government and move permanently into the private sector. Others try out the private sector a few years later and then possibly return again to the public sector, later; given the complete flexibility of the labour market.
Most relevant to India, this system does not guarantee promotions to the freshly appointed recruits. As appointments are made to particular positions, not to a service, these recruits cannot move into senior executive positions as a matter of right like in the IAS. On the other hand, those who are ambitious and competent advance very rapidly into senior executive roles even within ten years, unlike in India where it could take up to 20 years to reach similar levels of responsibility. In that sense there is no ‘ladder’ to climb here, rung by rung; only a rope that anyone can scramble up as quickly as their competence and ambition lets them. Some secretaries to the government here, with responsibilities equivalent to that of as many as five secretaries to the Government of India, combined, could be as young as 38 or less, while Deputy Secretaries, with responsibilities comparable to those of five Joint Secretaries in the Government of India, combined could be as young as 35. From day one, it is clear to everyone that their future in the public services is determined exclusivelyby their own effort and merit, not by any automatic chain of progression of every ‘batch’.
[Note: This is an extract from my book, Breaking Free of Nehru]
[i] E.g. see the Victorian graduate recruitment scheme at [http://www.graduates.vic.gov.au/].
Flexible Arrangements for Retirement Savings
One of the less widely known but extremely powerful drivers of the exchange of managerial talent between the public and private sectors in Australia is the system to save for retirement.
Indian Retirement System
In the Indian public services, eligibility for pensions begins only after a person completes 20 years of (qualifying) service. Thereafter, the government pays a certain proportion of the last salary drawn as a pension for life, as well as a lump-sum gratuity. In addition, there is a General Provident Fund (GPF) to which an IAS officer must mandatorily contribute at least 6 per cent of his salary at a fixed rate of interest. This fund can be used for contingencies leading up to retirement.
The key problem with this system is its great rigidity. It blocks the free flow of managerial and professional talent across the public and private sectors. For instance, most IAS officers who would have liked to gain private sector experience have no choice but to wait to complete 20 years and take voluntary retirement. On the one hand, they can’t return to public services if they resign prior to that, since no new recruitment takes place after the initial examinations. On the other hand, they cannot leave before 20 years without losing considerable benefits (as I have lost, for instance). These principles completely prevent the intermingling of experience between the public and private sectors in India. And after working exclusively in a tenured, low-performance public service for 20 years, even the high quality talent that is recruited into the IAS becomes valueless to the private sector. So if they were not ‘brave’ enough to get out by after seven to ten years, they are essentially stuck to perpetual mediocrity for life – and they can become very cynical about life. Very sour.
Australian Retirement System
On the other hand, in Australia, public servants do not get any pension.[i] Instead, everyone in Australia, irrespective of the sector in which they work, can draw annuities upon retirement from their privately managed superannuation fund, based on the actual contributions made to this fund during their lifetime. Two types of contributions can be made to this fund:
- Employer contributions: Since 1992 employers are compulsorily required to contribute (a minimum of) 9 per cent of the wages of an employee into a fund selected by the employee. This is treated as an employee contribution for tax purposes.
- Employee contributions: Both the employee and employer can contribute beyond the mandated minimum; there are tax benefits for such contributions.
This forms a system of compulsory employee saving. Here we could well ask: why can’t people be left free to save for themselves in a free society for their own retirement needs? (noting that GPF also acts as a compulsory saving.) Such coercive savings seem to violate the principles of freedom. And yet, if we add the argument of equality of opportunity, things become clearer. A free society’s government necessarily has to pick up the tab for any employee who falls below the poverty line after retirement; at least to bring that person above the poverty line. That creates a situation of moral hazard whereby some people may intentionally save insufficient amounts given that the government will always pick up the tab if they become poor. By forcing people to save at least a minimum amount through the superannuation system, a reasonable compromise is achieved. But leaving aside the question of whether this system of forced savings can be justified in a free society, it also has great practical merit. It enables people to move freely between the private and public sectors without any loss of retirement benefits. That is a great boon to the Australian economy.
[Note: This is an extract from my book, Breaking Free of Nehru]
[i] Civil servants who were recruited before compulsory superannuation was implemented were eligible for pensions but these have largely been transitioned to the new scheme and are expected to provide for their old-age themselves.
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