9 Responses to “The grave dangers of the proportional system of representation”

1. Sanjeev Sabhlok says:

   July 5, 2012 at 12:11 pm

   The grave dangers of the proportional system of representation http://t.co/tb2lRdpl #publicpolicy #elections
2. All Indian Blogs says:

   July 5, 2012 at 12:11 pm

   The grave dangers of the proportional system of representation http://t.co/7ArO9ani
3. Rohith says:

   July 5, 2012 at 11:54 pm

   I always had a variation of borda count voting system in mind as the upgrade to FPTP system.

   The goal is to reduce the feeling among the voters that their vote is being wasted and at the same time to make sure that elected representatives represent as much as the population as possible.

   So, I think, giving points to the top three choices (I came up with 10, 5 and 1) of each voter. Whoever gets the most points wins. This way, I think, the voter will now have the opportunity to balance the urge to vote for his/her favourite party/candidate (giving 10 points) and the urge to establish a stable govt. (giving 5 points). This way, I feel, the candidates who are really in the hearts and minds of the people have higher chance of winning.

   In the current FPTP system. many people tend to vote for the party which is likely to win (going by the media reports and the vocal minority’s huge voices). Voting like this is important because people want stable govts too. So I am searching for a system which balances these two urges.

   Am I wrong in assuming that both the urges (fav candidate and stable govt) are very important and they need to balanced? If no, then is a variation of borda count voting system (after deciding the number of points to each preference and number of preferences that will actually get non-zero points) the correct method to upgrade to from FPTP system? Please comment.
4. allwyn says:

   July 6, 2012 at 12:26 am

   I didn’t understand much. So a two party system is better? Is that the argument?
5. Sanjeev Sabhlok says:

   July 6, 2012 at 6:26 am

   Dear Rohith

   Your variation is promising but will need modelling of the types of results it will achieve. How different will these be from the current FPTP system? You should try out a few simple options and demonstrate how this might work.

   Another variation on FPTP exists in Australia but I believe this “variation” has caused grievous harm to Australia.

   In general, I’d be very cautious about any variation to FPTP. In life the simplest system (e.g. “tit for tat” in the case of contract theory) is often the best.

   And don’t forget the cost and challenges of implementing complex systems.

   s
6. Sanjeev Sabhlok says:

   July 6, 2012 at 6:28 am

   Allwyn, this is not about two party system but about a system that allows governments to implement policy. Under coalitions there is paralysis. Even FPTP can yield paralysis (as with the UPA government), but in PR it is chronic.
7. Supratim says:

   July 6, 2012 at 3:27 pm

   Absolutely against proportionate representation – as a system, besides the ills of entrenching minority opinions/policies as stated above, it also increases the power of the party bosses, while reducing the power of the people to elect their own representatives.

   I prefer a run-off as a second screen to the FPTP system, if the leading candidate does not secure 50% + 1 vote of the total number of votes polled. This works fairly well for various presidential and “single” election processes – while somewhat more expensive, I am sure it can also expanded to our system for both Lok Sabha and state assemblies.

   Cheers
8. Polevaulter Donkeyman says:

   July 7, 2012 at 6:11 pm

   Sanjeev,

   My response as requested. Cross posted on my blog. Would appreciate if you can cut-paste your comments there too.

   ======================

   Sanjeev Sabhlok excerpts from an article in The Australian by Janet Albrechtsen[1] on why proportional representation (PR) is bad (for Australia). He uses this article as to why India should not adopt PR for elections. I counter that all the evils of PR as propounded by the article happen in India too which uses the first past the post (FPTP) voting system

   Albrechtsen’s salient points are:

   PR ensures extremist (I read as non-major)[2] parties get representation

   No centrist party gets a majority and thus has to enter coalition government with the smaller extremist parties
   Thus these smaller extremist parties hold the balance of power
   Policies not desirable to the greater centre have to be adopted so as to placate the extremist party.
   Under PR, voters cannot know, when they vote, what the future governing coalition will look like
   It takes months of horse-trading and backroom deals to form a new government

   Refutation of Sanjeev Sabhlok’s contention

   Each of these above scenarios occur in India too which uses the FPTP system

   Table 1. Tally of Seats won by INC and BJP 1989-2009

   Lok Sabha[3]

   INC
   BJP
   Total/% of seats

   Ninth (1989)[4]

   195
   89
   Not calculated[5]

   Tenth (1991)
   252
   121
   373/68

   Eleventh (1996)
   140
   163
   303/56

   Twelfth (1998)
   142
   183
   325/60

   Thirteenth (1999)
   118
   189
   307/56

   Fourteenth (2004)
   159
   147
   306/56

   Fifteenth (2009)
   210
   117
   327/60

   Non-major centrist parties get elected to the Indian Parliament.

   The major parties in India closest to the “centre” are the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The last time the INC ever had a majority in the lower house of the Indian Parliament was in 1984.[6] The BJP has never achieved a majority on its own (it was formed in 1980)

   Thus even with FPTP 40-45% of the seats go to the non-major parties

   Thus the smaller parties hold the balance of power

   In 1999 the governing coalition was brought down by a minor partner[7]

   But it is not the smaller parties only which are guilty. In 1991 and 1997, the INC which was supporting the coalition from outside withdrew support resulting in elections

   Smaller parties in India have also forced the government to adopt policies at variance with the major party.

   The Indian government’s policy to allow foreign direct investment in the retail sector was derailed by the TrinaMool Congress (TMC) which has 20 (4%) of seats in the Lok Sabha and is a member of the current governing coalition.
   The Indian government barely survived a confidence motion in the Lok Sabha after the Left Front[8] having 60 (11%) seats withdrew support over the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement[9]

   It is laughable to say that under PR voters cannot know, at the time of voting, what the future governing coalition will look like. Such phenomenon occur in FPTP too.

   In the UK general elections in 2010 no party had a majority resulting in a coalition between the Tories and the Lib Dems. At the time a tory voter or a lib-dem voter voted, s/he had no idea that there would be a future governing coalition (let alone what it would look like).[10]

   Voters who voted for the Lib Dems, after the party pledged not to raise tuition fees, wouldn’t have known that the Lib Dems would vote for a tuition fee increase when in government as a coalition with the Tories.
   Voters who voted for the Tories, believing its manifesto promise to be tougher on Europe, wouldn’t have known that the Tory PM Cameron would make a U-turn on his campaign promise to support a campaign by the European Parliament to reduce its monthly “travelling circus” to Strasbourg.

   In India, due to the emergence of non-major parties on to the national scene, parties usually contest elections as part of larger coalitions, which one may think gives the voter an indication of what the future governing coalition would look like. However such coalitions are extraordinarily fluid and regularly lose and gain members.

   The United Progressive Alliance (of which INC is the major member and which is now in power) has regularly lost members.
   The National Democratic Alliance (of which BJP is the major member and which is now in opposition) has also regularly lost members.
   In fact most of the smaller parties keep switching between the two major parties. Thus even in an FPTP system voters cannot know, when they vote, what the future governing coalition will look like.

   The last objection to PR is that it leads to months of horse-trading and backroom deals to form a new government. Such horse trading and backroom deals are nothing new in India.

   Aaya Ram Gaya Ram politics in India have been going on for decades.
   Horse trading in Uttar Pradesh has a long and (un)distinguished history.
   In 1993 certain MPs of a small party were given “donations” of money to vote for the government and against a no-confidence motion (which the government survived).[11]

   Thus given the above evidence I believe, unlike Sanjeev, that India does not need to be wary of proportional representation because any “ills” it has are already manifested in India with its FPTP system. Sanjeev’s position therefore stands refuted.

   A Theoretical and Philosophical argument againt Albrechtsen

   Turning to a more theoretical and philosophical discussion regarding PR and FPTP, I wonder why Albrechtsen is hostile to small parties. Is it because as a supporter of one of the major Australian parties (the Liberals) she is does not like the feeling of having to negotiate and compromise with other duly elected representatives? It seems to me that the article is arguing that the centre should be allowed to ignore the non-central opinions, that the 60-70% of the electorate has the power to ignore the remaining 30-40% which does not agree with them.

   Turning to the issue of smaller parties preventing the adoption of good policies by the centrist parties, what is preventing the centrist parties to come together in support of the good policy and freezing out the smaller parties. e.g. in a 11 seat legislature let’s assume A has 5 seats, B has 4, and C and D have 1 each, with C and D being the non-centrist parties and A being in a coalition with C. If A is pushing a policy opposed by C with C threatening to leave the coalition why doesn’t A solicit support from B? If it is a reasonably centrist (and thus desirable according to Albrechtsen[12]) policy then I don’t see why B and A cannot negotiate some sort of acceptable compromise legislation. It is a failure of the major parties to come together to pass centrist policies and this failure is being disguised, by the likes of Albrechtsen, as the unreasonableness of the smaller parties.[13]

   As for smaller parties forcing through undesirable policies, who is letting them? The major parties should be blamed for kowtowing to the smaller parties in their lust for power. If the policy is undesirable to the major party what is stopping it from telling the smaller party to take hike? The fear that it will lose a no-confidence motion? So is staying in power more important to the major party than opposition to bad policy? And instead of blaming the major parties Albrechtsen is blaming the small parties?

   Australian Context

   One point that should be made is that Albrechtsen wrote this piece in the Australian context. In Australia the upper house is elected by a PR system incorporating a single transferable vote with an “above the line” system. In this system a voter instead of individually ranking each candidate, ranks slates of candidates (each slate comprising of all the party candidates). Since the parties are in possession of these preferences they can then trade them with each other. While such trading agreements are published in advance, they are complicated enough such that it is difficult for the average voter to easily determine the fate of his or her preferences. In such a context parties get enormous power on how to direct the individual voter’s vote. Thus it makes the parties powerful and also it abrogates the link between the elected official and the voters and weakens accountability. I agree with Albrechtsen and Sanjeev that such a system which gives so much power to parties is bad for democracy.[14]

   Personally I prefer the Instant Runoff Voting System. This allows voters to show their support for smaller parties without the risk of a major party losing because of a divided vote. Given that the Freedom Team of India (FTI) is a fringe party I am surprised Sanjeev[15] would not be in favour of a system which will allow people to vote for FTI without fears of a wasted vote.[16]

   A Note on Language

   The last important point I want to note is the language used by Albrechtsen. She uses the word “extremist” and “fringe” to denote the non-major parties. This a point worth noting. By labeling the non-major parties as extremist and fringe Albrechtsen is attempting to confine them to beyond the pale. However what is left unexplained is on what basis should the major parties be respected? Because they are supported by a majority of the public? The smaller parties are to be ignored because they are not supported by the majority? That logic is no different from one justifying the tyranny of the majority; so why constrain[17] the power of a government duly elected by a majority? But is being extremist wrong? In a polity dominated by major parties which do not believe in free trade[18] a position supporting free trade is by definition extremist. In a world where mainstream policy favours protectionism support for free trade is extremist. In a polity where the major parties do not believe in personal liberty[19] a position believing in personal liberty and autonomy is by definition extremist.

   Extremism in the defence of liberty is no vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.[20]

   A corollary to the above is the combination of Australia’s compulsory voting system with Albrechtsen’s view that fringe parties are not worthy of representation. It is akin to forcing people to go to the voting booth and then making them choose between alternatives which are both repulsive (one may be slightly less so than the other): “You must buy a car and it could be any colour you want as long as it’s vomit green or feces brown.”

   By Albrechtsen’s (and by extension Sanjeev’s) logic parties such as Lok Satta and FTI that are fringe (and extremist given the pro-statist ideologies of both the INC and the BJP) do not deserve legislative representation.[21]

   And the very last point. Majority government does not magically provide good policy and governance. A majority government is just as likely as a coalition to promulgate bad policy. It even finds it easier to ride rough-shod over individual freedom and liberty because there is no party in the legislature to challenge it. The only good government is a small government (whether minority or majority), constrained by a constitution with enough space for economic freedom and personal liberty to unleash the power of the free markets and free minds — the surest engine of human growth and progress.

   Footnotes

   
   

   [1] The Australian is the newspaper of the conservative establishment in Australia. Albrechtsen is a columnist for it. It is no surprise that the article is a paean to the establishment. ↩
   [2] This is a major point which I will come to later. As of now I will restrict myself to pointing out that the label of “extremism” is used to delegitimise the smaller parties. ↩
   [3] As of now its strength is 545 members ↩
   [4] The second largest party in that election was the Janata Dal which thereafter split repeatedly ↩
   [5] Because the INC and BJP were not the two largest parties ↩
   [6] 426 seats; The BJP had 2 seats. ↩
   [7] The minor partner was the AIADMK which had 18 MPs in a house of 545 (3%). It withdrew its support to the governing coalition because certain demands were not met e.g. dismissal of the then Tamil Nadu government run by AIADMK’s arch rival DMK ↩
   [8] A conglomeration of communist parties ↩
   [9] The said agreement is a most complicated agreement and on which I am not an expert. However it goes to original anti-PR point that small parties have a disproportionate influence on policy. My point has been that such disproportionate influence exists in FPTP too. ↩
   [10] One may object to this argument on the basis that it is not an apt analogy because in PR voters know that there would be a coalition, they only don’t know what it would look like and that this was not the case in the UK, since the voters expected their party to win (not the lib-dems surely?). However final polls before the start of voting show that no major party was close to getting a majority of the seats, thus raising the spectre of coalition. ↩
   [11] See also It’s official; political bribery is tax-free. Ask the taxman,
   ↩
   [12] Coalitions comprising of fringe parties produce “lower-quality policy and politics”. Supra note 1 ↩
   [13] The issue of FDI on retail in India is the example of such failure by the major parties. As has been detailed above the TMC held the governing coalition hostage. The BJP could have supported the governing coalition as it had supported the policy when in power. Of course needless to say it dropped such a policy when in opposition. ↩
   [14] One rationale for why above the line voting was adopted is that since Australia enforces compulsory voting it behoves the administration to make voting as easy as possible. However above the line voting is an attempt to mitigate the impact of a bad policy viz. compulsory voting (based on the same rationale as conscription) by another bad policy such that the net result is even worse. ↩
   [15] He is a member and supporter of the FTI. His writings on FTI. ↩
   [16] Some may object that IRV denies the “one person one vote principle” but I disagree. While it may seem that the voters whose first preference candidate loses get to vote a second time for another candidate, nobody is preventing any voter from ranking any number of candidates. If a voter declines to choose any candidate apart from his/her first preference, it is no different from an eligible voter abstaining from an election in an FPTP system. ↩
   [17] Courtesy Sanjeev Sabhlok. ↩
   [18] Only 25 members of the US House of Representatives in the 108th Congress voted consistently in favour of free trade Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the 108th Congress ↩
   [19] The House of Commons passed, by large majorities, the Health Act 2006 which banned smoking in pubs. A private member’s bill to exempt pubs from the 2006 ban was defeated in 2010 ↩
   [20] This is a paraphrase. The actual quote is “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” ↩
   [21] I have purposefully referred to Sanjeev’s writings on the two major parties of India given that his endorsement of the Albrechtsen’s viewpoint would lead to their entrenchment in the Indian polity. ↩
9. Shailesh says:

   July 10, 2012 at 10:44 am

   @PD – like many of your views, i totally agree with this one as well…

   in my view, FPTP is the simplest but probably the worst of the lot. PR is unnecessary maligned and IRV is the way to go for India (useful and non-controversial). See my short blog post on IRV.

   http://democracy4india.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/lets-move-from-fptp-to-irv-useful-and-non-controversial-electoral-reform/

   Let’s move from FPTP to IRV…useful and non-controversial electoral reform
   May 11, 2012

   India’s current system is first past the post (FPTP) where every voter selects the most preferred candidate and the candidate with the highest votes wins. Very simple.

   We need to move to instant run-off voting (IRV) where every voter ranks the candidates.

   Say, there are 10 candidates, the voter knows 5 of them and likes 3 of them. In this case, he should ideally press 3 buttons (first for his 1st preference candidate, then for his 2nd preference candidate and then for his 3rd preference candidate). If a voter doesn’t understand ranking/preference or is unaware, he can simply press 1 button (same as now).

   Counting of votes is complicated (Start with the 1st preference votes, eliminate the candidate with the least no. of first preference votes, redistribute his votes using the second preference of those voters and so on) but easy to automate /leave to experts.

   The cost of moving to IRV is one-time: upgrading the EVMs to allow ranking rather than a single choice.

   The benefits of IRV vis-a-vis FPTP:

   * encourages more people to vote by allowing them to articulate their choice better (its easy to curse people for not voting but currently the vote is too weak for many rational people to take the effort of using it. We need to incentivize the voters by strengthening the vote – introducing right to reject is another way to strengthen the vote)
   * eliminates tactical voting: Currently, instead of voting for their most preferred candidate A, many people vote for a more famous candidate B so as to decrease the winning chances of their least preferred candidate C. B wins despite being less preferred than A. Under IRV, people can choose A as their first preference and B as their second preference
   * fairer outcomes eg: a candidate with a 30% vote but hated by the other 70% might win under FPTP but will lose under IRV
   * encourages more people to contest elections not just by ensuring fairer outcomes but also by eliminating the risk of being a ‘spoiler’. eg: Currently, if there are 2 candidates – a liberal and a leftist. I am also a liberal. Even though I do not like the liberal candidate for some reasons, I do not contest elections for fear of splitting the liberal vote.

   Proportional representation is an even better method but generally opposed since it is believed to substantially increase the likelihood of minority/unstable governments – I don’t think it does but that is a slightly complex argument that I will make some other time.